Nayak — Marine Pilotage · Ch. 3: Pilot Transfer Procedures

1. Overview — Pilot Transfer as the Weakest Link

Source: NAYAK, Capt. Santosha K. Theory and Practices of Marine Pilotage. Chapter 3 — Pilot Transfer Procedures.

Syllabus: Anexo 2-B, Área II (Arte Naval), item 8 (NAYAK), Cap. 3 — embarque/desembarque do prático; arranjos de transferência; SOLAS Reg. V/23. Cross-list Área III, item 6.

A pilot boards the incoming vessel at a designated pilot boarding point, using the transfer arrangement rigged by the ship's crew or one arranged by the harbour authority for the prevailing weather. In almost every case the transfer is made by a pilot ladder rigged on the ship's side; a helicopter is used only in a minority of ports. The incoming pilot travels out on a purpose-built pilot boat, so getting from that boat onto the ship is the single most critical step of the whole operation.

Success depends on many factors at once: correct rigging of the ladder, the right procedures by both ship and boat crews, the pilot's own situational awareness, his donning of PPE, and clear communication between ship and boat. Yet the outcome rests most heavily on two things the pilot cannot control — the master's handling of the ship and the crew's correct rigging of the ladder. In that situation the pilot boat and the pilot have very little leverage.

Ships are built and operated to SOLAS in all respects, boarding arrangements included, but deficiencies in pilot-boarding arrangements are reported almost daily, usually through crew negligence. For the crew a transfer may be one more routine job; for the pilot it is the single most critical operation of the day even though he repeats it constantly. Small shortcomings on the ship's part have cost pilots their lives and injured them for life.

Because it is the weakest link in delivering a safe pilotage, the transfer deserves close analysis. The book frames it with a key idea: a transfer is a composite team work of three independent teams — the ship staff, the boat staff and the pilot himself. When one team with one leader does a job, foresight and teamwork absorb most of the risk. With three teams, three leaders and different cultural backgrounds, the hazards are not controlled effectively. The person whose life is at stake must lead from the front, so the pilot has the final say in a transfer. He must never be in a hurry, never neglect his own safety, and never rely on the competence or mercy of the other two teams. Blaming the ship alone does not close the topic.

2. Accident Statistics and Significant Deficiencies

One study identifies marine pilots as having one of the highest rates of work-related traumatic fatality — 54 deaths per 100,000 persons per year, against 5.5 for all workers combined. Pilots themselves report ladder transfers out at sea as the greatest hazard to their personal safety. Central injury data are not held in any single repository, so figures are pieced together from scattered fatality reports; those reports confirm repeated deaths and serious injuries worldwide, mostly caused by falls from the ladder.

An injury mechanism is the action, exposure or event that most directly caused the most serious injury. Across transfers, three mechanisms dominate.

2.1 Body stress

Body stress is injury to muscles, tendons, ligaments and bones from load that exceeds the tissue's capacity for repair, whether from a brief trauma or, more commonly, long-term cumulative exposure. It drives disorders such as nerve-compression syndromes (for example carpal tunnel) and musculoskeletal disease of the back, shoulders and joints. Sprains and strains remain the most common workplace injury group (about 64% of all workplace injuries) and the most expensive (about 70% of costs). The evident physical risk factors in a ladder climb are awkward postures — neck bent, shoulders elevated, wrists deviated, back bent — combined with force to pull and grasp, and repetition. Pilot accident studies confirm disorders in elbows, shoulders, wrists, necks, backs and knees.

2.2 Being hit by boat, ladder or objects

These injuries come from an object striking the person — being crushed by the vessel, struck by the ladder, whipped by a loose rope, or hit by something dropped from the ship. The pilot's environment is uniquely dangerous because nothing is stationary: ship and boat move independently, and the ladder, not fastened to the hull, swings out and falls back against the side. The main "being hit" scenarios recorded are legs crushed between ladder and boat when the boat hits the ship's side, a foot entangled in the ladder or lines, and an arm struck by the ladder.

2.3 Fall from height

Falls are the most common pilot injury. Worldwide, 10–15% of all work-related fatalities come from falls from a height — equal to vehicle accidents (15%) and second only to being hit by moving objects (35%). Ladder falls alone account for over 1,000 injury claims per year, and the higher the fall, the higher the rate of serious injury and death.

The maximum height a pilot climbs on the ladder is 9 metres above the water, as per SOLAS. The Japanese Pilots' Association Handbook (1994), however, identifies 5 metres as a maximum safe climbing level.

Water and hard surfaces behave differently. Falls into water carry roughly 15% survival, best for a feet-first vertical entry because the longer deceleration produces fewer fractures than a horizontal impact. On hard surfaces the picture is grim even at low height: in falls under 3 m, 59% of injuries were moderate or serious; over 4 m, that rose to 86%. In a set of 176 falls under 6 m, 35% of patients had head injuries and 22% had spinal-cord injuries or vertebral fractures. Forensic study of falls from about 9.8 m showed the body aligns and lands horizontally, and injury depends on the force, the size of the impact area, and bone properties; flexing the joints at impact dissipates deceleration forces (parachutists cut those forces up to 36 times this way). Fatality also rises steeply with age.

2.4 Special case — ladder-fall risk factors

A comprehensive US analysis of step-ladder accidents grouped the risks into four families and, importantly, ranked them.

Working-condition predictors included night or evening shifts, longer hours, awkward positions, little control over the order of tasks, and work needing great strength. Ladder-use predictors included longer hours on the ladder (fatigue), less ladder experience, no choice of ladder, over-reaching, being thrown from the ladder, slippery steps and miss-stepping. Pilot transfers require working at height — a minimum of 2–3 m and estimated maxima of about 15 m from the boat deck and 17 m from the water for a light-draught capesize vessel. The transitions (boat to pilot ladder, pilot ladder to accommodation ladder) and any need to over-reach are judged the major risks of the task.

3. Risks During Transfer, Frequency and Negligence in Duties

Embarkation and disembarkation carry many risks, and the major one is always to the pilot's life, with only trivial risk of damage to ship's fittings. The book enumerates the recurring risks.

• Ladder breaks while boarding; the combination ladder does not hold with the pilot on it.
• Ropes and handrails slippery; the long ladder twists; steps tilted from poorly secured chocks.
• Deck securing arrangement not proper or poorly maintained; insufficient lighting of the embarkation area.
• Improper or slow response from crew and master in an urgent situation.
• Pilot falls into the water, or falls onto the hard boat deck and is injured.
• Pilot's leg hit by the rolling boat against the ship's side; pilot loses focus or health deteriorates through panic.

Most transfer accidents go unreported and reach wide circulation only when a life is lost or someone is seriously injured. The book argues for a proper reporting procedure and broad circulation of incidents and near misses, to build awareness and feed continual improvement. The risks are largely generated by negligence and complacency shared by all stakeholders — pilot, ship staff and boat crew — so each must cross-check and balance the others. The duties below, done independently and in co-ordination, form that system of checks and balances.

When the three teams discharge their duties independently, cross-check one another and work in tandem, the generated risk is effectively managed and transfer accidents fall sharply. The answer is not to blame the poor rope of the ladder but to put a mechanism in place that guarantees the composite team work is done properly — a task for local or national authorities to suit their conditions.

4. SOLAS Regulation V/23 — Access and Egress

Pilot transfer is governed by SOLAS Regulation V/23. It applies to ships that may employ pilots; equipment installed on or after 1 July 2012 must meet the full regulation, while older equipment must at least meet the regulation in force before that date, and any replacement must comply as far as reasonable and practicable.

Under the general provisions, every arrangement must efficiently enable the pilot to embark and disembark safely, be kept clean and maintained, be regularly inspected, and be used solely for embarkation of personnel. The rigging and the embarkation must be supervised by a responsible officer with a means of communication to the bridge, who also arranges a safe escort of the pilot. Each pilot ladder must be certified by the manufacturer, permanently tagged for identification, and logged with its date of entry into service and any repairs.

4.1 Transfer arrangements — the 9-metre rule

Arrangements must let the pilot board and land on either side. Access must be by one of two methods, chosen by the distance from the water surface to the point of access.

The pilot ladder must be positioned and secured so that it is clear of the ship's discharges, within the parallel body length and as far as practicable within the mid-ship half-length, with each step resting firmly against the hull. Its single length must reach the water from the point of access, allowing for all conditions of loading and trim and for an adverse list of 15°; the securing strong point, shackles and ropes must be at least as strong as the side ropes.

For a combination arrangement, the accommodation ladder is sited leading aft, and its lower platform is secured against the ship's side within the parallel body length and clear of discharges. The pilot ladder and manropes are secured nominally 1.5 m above the bottom platform; where the accommodation ladder has a trapdoor in that platform (an embarkation platform), the pilot ladder and manropes are rigged through the trapdoor, extending above the platform to handrail height.

4.2 Deck access, doors, hoists, equipment and lighting

Safe, unobstructed passage must be provided between the head of the ladder and the ship's deck — through a gateway with handholds, or a bulwark ladder with two rigidly secured handhold stanchions. Two prohibitions are absolute.

The following associated equipment must be at hand for immediate use: two manropes of not less than 28 mm and not more than 32 mm in diameter, secured to a deck ring plate and reaching the height of the stanchions or bulwark; a lifebuoy with a self-igniting light; and a heaving line. Adequate lighting must illuminate the overside arrangements and the deck embarkation position.

These revised requirements are consolidated in the IMO circular on boarding arrangements, illustrated in the reference poster below.

Revised requirements under SOLAS Reg. V/23 and MSC.1/Circ.1428 apply to equipment installed on or after 1 July 2012. For existing ships: mechanical hoists shall not be used; shipside doors opening outwards (on ships built before 1 January 1994) must be modified by the first survey on or after 1 July 2012; replacement equipment must comply as far as reasonably practicable — all in close co-operation with the Classification Society and Flag Administration.

5. Safe Procedures for Boarding and Disembarkation

5.1 Communications before approaching

Before the pilot approaches, a minimum exchange must occur. Well ahead of arrival the ship provides the port or pilotage authority with its arrival intentions, draught and dimensions, ship characteristics, and any bridge-equipment or other deficiency. In return the authority passes back the pilot boarding point, reporting and communication procedures, the prospective berth and anchorage, and routeing information so the master can draft a tentative passage plan — recognising that the plan is not final until the pilot is aboard.

5.2 While approaching for boarding

As he approaches, the pilot confirms a checklist: that crew health is in order and the ship has free pratique; that bridge equipment is tried and working; which side the ladder is rigged and its height above water; that the ladder has been tested; the exact boarding position; and the speed and heading required. Crucially, he reminds the master that the main engine must be stopped just before he attempts to board, so course, speed and position are adjusted beforehand. It is good practice for the ship to send a photograph of the ladder's deck and gunwale securing before the pilot even sets out.

5.3 The boarding point

The boarding point should be the designated pilot station, located far enough from the port to allow a comprehensive exchange of information and agreement of the final passage plan, with sea-room for the ship's safety and clear of traffic routes. The book criticises pilots who take shortcuts and call the ship closer to the fairway to save time: this removes the time margin built in for information exchange and jeopardises safety. Some ports designate multiple boarding points by vessel type or draught, and both master and pilot must respect why a point sits where it does.

5.4 Making a lee for the pilot boat

Approaching the boarding point, the ship proceeds at an appropriate speed and heading to make a good lee for the boat. A good lee lets the boat lie steady against the ship's side; swell that makes the boat roll and pitch creates real dangers.

• The boat may hit the pilot's legs as he steps onto the ladder, likely causing a fall.
• A fall onto the hard boat deck brings injury and further damage.
• The ladder's lower steps may entangle with the boat, damaging the ladder.
• Entanglement can pull the ladder hard enough to part the ropes even when the ladder is sound.

The pilot must judge the boat's vertical and lateral movement and, if unsafe, ask for a better lee or wait for the boat to reach the top of its roll before catching the ladder. If, after due diligence, the transfer is still unsafe, the pilot must refuse to board; commercial pressure must not override his safety, and the port authority's duty is to support that refusal, not force the risk.

5.5 Checks just before boarding

When the boat is alongside, the pilot takes a minute for minimum safety checks — a minute that wastes no one's time. He checks the overall condition of the ladder (wooden steps, chocks, loose or broken steps), the ropes, the magnets securing it to the side, that it is not tilted and is free of grease and slippery handrails, that lighting is sufficient, that the OOW is standby with a walkie-talkie and support crew is ready, that a lifebuoy with line and light is manned by someone ready to throw it, that a heaving line is passed for his bag, that the boat is steady, and that the deck securing is sound.

The duty officer at the ladder runs a parallel check just before boarding: that the pilot dons a life jacket and proper PPE, carries no backpack (any bag is hauled up by heaving line), that the boat is steady, and that communication is established. Any deficiency by the pilot is reported to the master, who reports the unsafe act to port control. Only after the duty officer's go-ahead signal should the pilot start climbing.

5.6 While boarding

On the ladder the pilot focuses on nothing but his hands, legs and grip: at every moment one hand and one leg keep a tight grip, and he releases the first pair only after the second has a firm hold. Two debated safeguards attach to this phase.

The second issue is stopping the main engine while the pilot is on the ladder. The logic: if the pilot falls into the water with the ship making way, he drifts toward the stern within seconds; a running propeller creates a negative-pressure zone that sucks him in, while a stopped propeller lets him float clear aft. The controversy is only whether the ship can stop for the one to three minutes needed given weather, current or nearby hazards — and every effort must be made to create conditions where she can, even for less than a minute.

6. Helicopter Transfers

Helicopters are the second most prevalent transfer method and have been used for many years — Germany from as early as 1974, and the Columbia River Bar Pilots in the USA after extensive trials. They are chosen where weather is difficult, with heavy swell, confused seas and high winds, and shorter distances are usually covered by boat while longer ones go by helicopter.

Helicopters are reported to handle about 70% of all transfers with no injuries or deaths, across some 2,200–3,000 transfers per year. On the Norwegian west coast the split is 80% land-on, 20% winch-on.

Helicopters are also used in Australian ports such as Newcastle and Gladstone and within the Great Barrier Reef. As concern grows over ladder injuries, more ports are considering them. The reference document for these operations is the Code of Safe Practice for Ship-Helicopter Transfers published by AMSA.

7. Pilot Embarkation Platform System — the Dangerous Trap-Door

This arrangement is used on many vessels, especially large container ships. Although mechanical pilot hoists are banned by IMO Resolution A.1045(27), these systems remain in use with little concern from classification societies, and a pilot recently died in the UK after falling from one.

The system consists of a davit hoisting mechanism for an aluminium ladder, a platform fitted to that ladder's lower end, and a rope pilot ladder fitted below the platform, so the pilot climbs the rope ladder and enters through a trap-door to reach the fixed platform.

Beyond non-compliance, pilots report severe practical difficulties: because the ladder hangs from the platform it is not firm against the ship's side; the trap-door transition requires climbing at an awkward angle of about 110 degrees; there is no vertical handrail immediately after leaving the rope, forcing the pilot to stretch backwards to a horizontal rail whose large diameter gives a poor grip; the rope ladder's securing fittings below the platform (eye pad, thimble) are often badly rusted and poorly maintained; and the trap-door opening is too small for some pilots.

Several senior, experienced pilots have died on this mechanism — in late 2019 and mid-2020, two pilots of the same US port were lost in back-to-back incidents — yet no appreciable action has followed.

8. Novelty Methods and Fall-Protection Systems

Other mechanical transfer methods have been made redundant and banned, leaving the pilot ladder in fair weather as the safest available method — though, as shown above, not free of accidents. The way forward is to keep the pilot ladder but add safety measures to the procedure so that risk from negligence or situational pressure is greatly reduced, without compromising the basic rules of working aloft.

The Code of Safe Working Practices (COSWP), §15.1, on working aloft and over the side, provides: such work should not be permitted if the ship's movement makes it hazardous; all seafarers should wear safety harnesses and restraints appropriate to the conditions; safety nets should be rigged where necessary; persons over the side should wear life jackets or flotation devices; and a competent person should continuously supervise them.

The risk of being hit by the boat can be managed by adjusting course and speed; the un-addressed risk is the fall. To design controls, the book breaks a fall into five phases, so a control at any phase can neutralise the risk.

All fall-protection systems aim to arrest the fall with limited impact force, and the harness design and position strongly affect the body's angle after the fall. Evidence supports their value.

The basic equipment has three parts: a lanyard or free-fall device, an anchorage point, and a safety harness. Four device types are described.

Types b, c and d should be anchored to a point above the user, offset by generally no more than 10 degrees from the vertical (or as the manufacturer recommends). The safety harness is central: its attachment point governs neck movement, body rotation and spinal compression, and so the location and severity of injury, which is why an innovative harness designed for pilot transfer has real potential.

The most real problem is the suspension period right after a fall: held upright and perhaps unconscious, the person can suffer orthostatic shock from venous pooling and reduced cardiac output. Death can occur after suspension of even less than 10 minutes, so immediate rescue and careful treatment are critical. The essence of fall protection is that it hinders nothing when all goes well, but on a bad day it saves the pilot's life — better to adopt it and gather real feedback than to reject it and keep losing victims year after year.