1. Introduction — why bridge team management matters
In the past a commercial voyage was an adventure. Today most voyages are routine: the cargo is delivered safely and on time. But sometimes voyages are not completed and cargoes are not delivered, and that always comes as a shock to mariners, owners, charterers and the public. We forget that, even with reliable engines and modern technology, the voyage is still a risk and the ship is still subject to the vagaries of nature.
Source: SWIFT, A. J.; BAILEY, T. J. Bridge Team Management: a practical guide. 2nd ed. London: The Nautical Institute, 2004. Chapter 1 — Bridge Team Management (pp. 1-8).
Edital: Anexo 2-B, Área III, item 1 (Swift & Bailey) → Chapter 1 — Bridge Team Management · Anexo 2-A, Área III, itens 10-11 (Passage planning · Teamwork / Executing / Monitoring).
Non-completion of a voyage is not only the result of a hostile environment. The majority of incidents at sea are the result of human error, and in many of those cases the information that could have prevented the incident was available but was either unappreciated or not used. Most accidents happen because there is no system in operation to detect, and so prevent, one person making the kind of mistake all human beings are liable to commit. This book exists to make the voyage safer by explaining how to carry out the different aspects of bridge team management.
This is the second edition, published some ten years after The Nautical Institute issued the original. The ideas were developed at the Simulator Section of the Maritime Operations Centre of the Southampton Institute of Higher Education. The first edition became the definitive book on the subject, yet world shipping still did not always follow team management and passage planning — until the world authorities caught up with the industry and the IMO issued recommendations on both. This edition puts those recommendations into plain seafaring English (chapters 9 and 10), with the IMO recommendation on the left-hand page and its meaning alongside.
5.14 Members of the navigational watch should at all times be prepared to respond efficiently and effectively to changes in circumstances. — IMO STCW B-VIII Part 3.1 (Guidance on keeping a safe navigational watch)
That statement makes it clear that, however well a voyage has been planned and conducted, and however well the team has worked together, everything can change. That is when teamwork and planning come into their own: any officer, even the most junior, may have to make a decision that seems beyond his capability. But under a good system of bridge team management, and with a carefully drawn-up passage plan, even the most inexperienced officer has a substantial fund of knowledge to back up his actions and can be confident his decisions will be safe.
2. Team Management — the meaning of the title
Running a ship ideally requires the highest-calibre personnel and the latest equipment. In today's harsh economic reality that is often not possible: bridge teams frequently consist of mixed-ability personnel working with outdated equipment. To complete the voyage successfully it is the concern of every officer to make the best possible use of the resources available — both human and material — and each member of the team has a part to play.
The title "Team Management" refers to the interaction required within the team for the system to work. It does not mean an act of management by one person; it means a continuous acceptance and understanding by every team member that they all have to fulfil the roles to which they have been assigned.
To achieve good results consistently, two kinds of factor must be addressed: first, technical knowledge and skills (including the techniques of preparing for and conducting the voyage — passage planning); and second, the more traditional man-management or "people" skills involved in developing human resources. The smooth running of any bridge team depends on the basic principles of good communication and man management, and with current manning policies these skills must be developed on board to overcome cultural boundaries as well as the traditional hierarchical rank structure.
3. Training and Coaching, Well Being and Morale
3.1 Training and coaching
How well a person does a job depends partly on the quality of the training received — a poorly motivated trainer often produces a poorly motivated trainee. The methods of passing on knowledge split into two main groups that differ in concept:
| Method | What it is | Watch out for |
|---|---|---|
| Training | Instructing a person in the execution of various tasks or procedures to a required standard. | Direct training suits very inexperienced personnel or new concepts; "Sit next to Nelly and she will show you" drains already-stretched human resources. |
| Coaching | Developing existing abilities through delegation and monitoring. | It is a fine line between delegation for coaching and abrogation of one's own responsibilities. Delegating too early, before the trainee is ready, can be devastating — confidence is undermined. |
As with any coaching, the trainee must be supervised and given sufficient feedback on progress: lack of feedback prevents the trainee from understanding how to improve. Building a team from a selection of individuals takes effort — not all members start with the same baseline of knowledge. Once the team is functioning, the flow of information increases as the members gain confidence. One of the team's primary functions is to provide a system of checking and cross-checking the decisions that affect the passage of the ship.
3.2 Well being
The efficient team member is both mentally and physically fit. Watchkeeping is often seen as a passive role, and in low-key situations it can be: the watchkeeper merely maintains the present unstressed situation. But the role can change dramatically when risk develops, requiring forceful action to prevent a situation arising rather than merely responding once things get out of control. That kind of reaction demands a high standard of physical and mental well being.
3.3 Morale
A demoralised team — or even demoralised individual members — will not produce the high standards needed to keep the ship safe. Morale depends on many factors, but good teamwork and effective operation are achieved when team members are clear about their role, can see the results of their own efforts, have their deficiencies carefully corrected, and are given credit when it is due.
4. Error chains and situational awareness
Maritime incidents and disasters are seldom the result of a single event; they are almost invariably the culmination of a series of non-serious incidents — an error chain. Situational awareness — knowing what is happening in and around the ship — helps the OOW or other watchkeeper to recognise that an error chain is developing and to take action to break the chain.
Certain signs, apparent to members of the bridge team, indicate that an error chain is developing. They do not necessarily mean an incident is about to happen, but that the passage is not being conducted as planned and that some situational awareness may be lacking — the ship is being put at unnecessary risk, and action must be taken. The book identifies seven indications.
4.1 Ambiguity
Ambiguity may be obvious or a subtle sign that things are not as expected. When two independent position-fixing systems disagree — for example a Radar fix and a GPS position that are not the same — something is plainly wrong with one of the fixes; immediate action is required to determine which is correct. A more subtle case: the echo sounder reading does not agree with the charted depth; the conscientious OOW will try to find out why rather than just accept it. Ambiguity also exists when two team members disagree on a point of action — not necessarily dangerous in itself, but a sign that one of them may be losing situational awareness — or when pre-agreed decisions such as night orders or company procedures are not being followed. Finally, ambiguity may stem from inexperience: a junior officer must feel confident he can voice his doubts without being reprimanded, because what seems an unwarranted worry one time may identify a real hazard the next.
4.2 Distraction
Distraction is the full attention of a person on one event to the exclusion of others, or concentration on an irrelevancy — a sign that situational awareness is breaking down, even briefly. It can be caused by excessive workload, stress or fatigue, emergency conditions, or simple inattention to detail. It can also be caused by an unexpected but non-threatening event, such as a VHF call, which takes a person's full attention away from more urgent needs. In such a case a senior officer, e.g. a pilot having the con, may have to be made aware of the distraction.
4.3 Inadequacy and confusion
Inadequacy and confusion must not be mistaken for the ordinary confusion of a junior officer who simply lacks the experience to cope with a complex situation. Genuine inadequacy and confusion arise even in senior officers in disaster circumstances and must be noted and corrected before they become dangerous.
4.4 Communication breakdown
Breakdown in communications occurs in several ways. Team members may simply not understand one another because they are from different backgrounds, or even different parts of the same country — practising everyday communication can easily rectify this. Understanding a pilot of a different cultural background does not lend itself to practice and develops only with experience; such a situation should have been allowed for at the planning stage. Difficulty understanding a person on a shore radio station or another ship is overcome only by patience and perseverance.
4.5 Improper con or lookout
It is not always clear who actually has control of the ship. The arrival of the master on the bridge does not necessarily transfer the con to him: until he states otherwise, the con remains with the OOW. The clearest way to settle this is for the OOW to make a log-book entry recording that the master has taken the con — a procedure recommended in the ICS Bridge Procedures Guide. A similar situation arises with a pilot on board: normally the master has the con when making the pilot station and should state clearly when the pilot takes the con, again clarified by a log entry. A lookout unclear about his duties is usually the result of poor team management.
4.6 Non-compliance with the passage plan
Non-compliance with the passage plan may follow from the improper con above and is another sign that situational awareness is breaking down. Unjustified departure from a clearly defined and understood passage plan must be recognised as such a breakdown. For example, the OOW of a ship proceeding in the wrong lane of a Traffic Separation Scheme must ask himself "why am I doing this?" — the ship is off the planned track and in direct violation of the International Rules, and if he is both deviating from track and ignoring the Rules, he is probably not fully aware of the ship's position. Any of these indications requires the person who notices it to act: either correct the fault himself, or draw the attention of others — or the whole team — to the error.
4.7 Procedural violation
Procedural violations occur much like non-compliance with the passage plan. Again the question must be asked: "why are we doing it this way?" If the question cannot be easily answered, the OOW or watchstander must be doubly careful.
5. Casualties and their causes
At the International Safety Conference (INTASAFCON III), held in Norway in 1975, it was agreed that two principal factors were the main causes of collisions and groundings:
1. Weaknesses in bridge organisation and the result of such weaknesses. 2. Failure to keep a good lookout. — INTASAFCON III, Norway, 1975
Such casualties could have been avoided by the following measures:
| Measure | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| Setting double watches in appropriate circumstances | Too often a more complex situation is run with the same manning as deep-sea, where hazards are less immediate. |
| Ensuring sufficient personnel are available in special circumstances | Extra personnel prepare equipment or stand by; if called too late they arrive only once the ship is already in the situation they could have prevented. |
| Precise instructions for calling the master | The master is too often called after a situation has irredeemably deteriorated. If in any doubt whatsoever, call him. |
| Posting lookouts | An OOW who keeps the lookout himself, on top of his other duties, may neglect important tasks. |
| Manning the wheel | An unmanned wheel forces the OOW to monitor and correct steering, which may cause him to overlook other duties. |
| An established drill for changing automatic to manual steering | Major incidents are on record where lack of awareness of the steering system in use, or how to change over, led to disaster. |
| Precise instructions on reducing speed in reduced visibility | A busy OOW may not notice that visibility has dropped, especially at night, or may underestimate the extra workload. Night or standing orders prevent this. |
6. Groundings and their causes
The following features have been noticeable as causes of grounding — each is a failure to do something that the navigational plan and bridge organisation should guarantee:
| # | Failure | Consequence |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Failure to pre-plan a track | Mariners feel they know the area, or there is a pilot aboard — but there is little point planning and then not showing the track on the chart. |
| 2 | Failure to adequately monitor progress along the planned track | Even with a track on the chart, irregular fixing leaves the OOW unaware the ship is deviating, perhaps towards danger. |
| 3 | Failure to take immediate action to regain track | The attitude that "it doesn't matter, there is enough safe water" when that is not actually the case. Ships are never planned to go aground. |
| 4 | Failure to cross-check fixes by one means against another | With a single fixing method in constrained waters, a mis-identified mark or faulty electronic data goes unnoticed — a false sense of security. |
| 5 | Failure to use visual fixing when available | Electronic fixes may be accurate but do not necessarily relate the ship's position to navigational hazards. |
| 6 | Failure to use the echo sounder on landfall or in constrained waters | The nearest danger is usually vertically below; under-keel clearance warns of approaching danger though it is not a position fix. |
| 7 | Failure to correctly identify navigational lights | An observer convinces himself he sees the light he is looking for, not the one he is looking at. |
| 8 | Failure to have important decisions independently checked by another officer | Human beings make errors; such errors must not occur without being noticed and corrected. |
Many of these failures occur because the OOW does not appreciate the complexity of his role in a deteriorating situation — often because those responsibilities have not been made clear to him.
8. The Plan — the framework of the book
Voyages of whatever length can be broken down into two major stages, which in turn give the four building blocks that structure the rest of the book (chapters 2 to 5):
| Stage | Building block | Covered in |
|---|---|---|
| 1. PREPARATION | a. Appraisal | Chapter 2 — Passage Appraisal |
| b. Planning | Chapter 3 — Passage Planning | |
| 2. EXECUTION | c. Organisation | Chapter 4 — Executing the passage/voyage plan |
| d. Monitoring | Chapter 5 — Monitoring the Ship's Progress |
This four-part skeleton — Appraisal → Planning → Organisation → Monitoring — is the spine of bridge team management. Everything in the chapters that follow hangs from it: appraisal gathers the information, planning turns it into a track on the chart, organisation puts the right people and procedures in place to execute it, and monitoring confirms continuously that the ship is following the plan and remains safe.